The United States emerged from World War II as the acknowledged global leader in basic science and its industrial application. While U.S. science has been able to maintain that preeminence in most areas, the nation's technological lead has met increasingly formidable challenges from abroad. Although the evidence on recent U.S. performance is mixed, other nations, and especially Japan, have clearly gained ground in high-technology production and trade. The future of U.S. high-technology production has thus emerged as a major focus of public policy. This paper reviews the recent performance of U.S. high-techology industries, examines possible motives underlying government policies to promote high-technology production, and offers some guidelines for evaluating the outcomes of alternative policy regimes.
emerged as a major focus of public policy. This paper examines the recent performance of U.S. high-technology industries and policy options for maintaining or improving that performance.
Section I reviews postwar trends in U.S. performance relative to major competitors abroad and the implications of these trends for U.S. trade. Section II analyzes the distinctive economic features of high-technology industries and evaluates the potential costs and benefits from policies to promote hightechnology production. Section III presents an approach for evaluating policy alternatives. Section IV sums up implications of a diminished U.S. lead in science and technology for U.S. international competitiveness and national well-being. The balance of trade in high-technology products Despite some significant losses on particular goods, the U.S. trade surplus in high-technology manufactured products rose from $6.1 billion in 1970 to $26.6 billion in 1980. Net trade in other manufacturing followed an opposite trend, with the deficit on U.S. trade in non-high-technology products growing from $3.8 1 High-technology industries are usually defined either in terms of the proportion of "professional, technical, ind kindred" workers in total employment or the ratio of research and development expenditures to total sales. billion in 1970 to $9.2 billion by 1980 (Table 1) .
But 1980 proved to be a turning point for U.S. performance in high-technology trade. The surplus generated by hightechnology products narrowed in each subsequent year, falling to $3.6 billion by 1985. The deterioration was less marked than in other manufacturing industries, where by 1985 the deficit had reached an astonishing level of $111 billion. However, the pattern was similar, with deterioration of U.S. performance in almost every product category and in almost every major trading relationship.
For both high-technology and non-high-technology trade, the declining balances have reflected primarily surging U.S. imports rather than falling U.S. exports. In high-technology trade, the value of U.S. expo.rts nearly doubled between 1978 and 1985 --but imports more than tripled over the same period. For non-hightechnology manufactures, the contrast between export and import growth was even more dramatic, with the value of exports rising from $66.6 billion in 1978 to $93.5 billion in 1985 while imports soared from $90.6 billion to $204.6 billion.
The relatively minor reduction in the U.S. high-technology trade surplus in comparison to the marked decline in performance of mature industries is a reflection of continuing U.S. leadership in many high-technology sectors. Producers in the United States operate at a substantial labor-cost disadvantage relative to most trading partners, and the impact of this cost disadvantage on U.S. sales is greatest where comparable goods are available from a number of sources worldwide. The U.S. cost disadvantage was exacerbated in the first half of the 1980s by the rising international value of the dollar.
But in the high-technology field, the United States remains the sole source of many leading-edge goods (and services). For these products, labor costs and exchange rates therefore play a smaller role in determining U.S. trade performance. Even so, high costs of U.S. production can influence the decision of U.S. firms. to establish subsidiaries abroad. The main "foreign't competition for U.S. high-technology products often comes from affiliates of U.S. companies.
The U.S. share in world exports U.S. shares in world production or world exports likewise confirm a decline in the U.S. relative position. This is true both in manufacturing overall and in high-technology manufacturing. Part of this decline can be attributed to the influence of "temporary" macroeconomic factors, especially the huge U.S. budget deficit. However, it also reflects a process that can be expected to continue and even to accelerate: an increase in the number of nations with the knowledge base and the industrial capacity to quickly absorb and apply new technologies.
In 1950, the United States accounted for more than 40 percent of total world output and about 17 percent of world exports. By 1980, the U.S. share in global output had dwindled to 22 percent and its exports to 11 percent. These data are used 6 by Bhagwati and Irwin (1987) to establish a striking parallel between the postwar decline in U.S. global dominence and the relative decline of Britain in the nineteenth century.
However, the use of 1950 as a base year for the comparison may exaggerate the decline in relative economic strength of the United States. As Baldwin (1984) points out, the period immediately after World War II was itself atypical. The United States had emerged from the war with greatly expanded productive capacity, while its erstwhile adversaries and allies alike had sustained extensive losses of capital and manpower. Every U.S. manufacturing industry was able to show a trade surplus, a situation that masked the relative weakness of some. U.S. shares of world activity just after the war were significantly above the corresponding measures for the period just before the war. The U.S. share of total exports of the ten most important industrial countries was 35 percent as late as 1952, while it had been only 26 percent in 1938 and 28 percent in 1928.
Looking specifically at national shares in total world exports of high-technology products, the U.S. share has actually risen in recent years and by 1984 was less than two percentage points below its 1965 level (25.2 percent versus 27.5 percent;
see Table 2 ). The dramatic change in the global market has been the increase in the Japanese share, which rose from 7.3 percent in 1965 to 20.2 percent in 1984. However, the Japanese gains have come primarily at the expense of other nations, notably the United Kingdom, rather than the United States. Of course some U.S. sectors did better than the average while others lost ground to foreign competitors. The largest loss of export-market share both for U.S. production and for U.S. This evidence suggests that much of the current discussion of declining U.S. competitiveness does not fit the facts. In particular, analyses that focus on failings of U.S. management and innovation are inconsistent with the sustained market shares of U.S. firms. Rather, the data show that the United States has lost ground as primarily as a locus of production. Differences in costs are presumably the main factor underlying the shift abroad by multinational corporations of production activities.
Effective policies to improve U.S. competitiveness must address the determinants of these costs in order to upgrade the United States as a site for production. Critics of U.S. policy argue that the United States has fallen behind in research and development, relative both to other major nations today and to its own past efforts. This assessment is based largely on comparisons of R&D spending as a share of gross national product (GNP), a measure that shows other nations catching up to or even surpassing the United States (see Table   4 ) .
Implications of the closing gap
Yet the United States still spends far more in total than any other OECD nation, a reflection of the nation's much larger size.
(The Soviet Union, not an OECD member, is estimated to allocate an amount comparable to that of the United States.)
While R&D spending as a fraction of GNP varies surprisingly little across the major industrial nations, there are significant differences in the allocation of funds among alternative uses.
In relation to its major commercial rivals, the United States skews its R&D resources toward defense projects. In 1984, defense accounted for two-thirds of total U.S. spending for research and development, with civil space research taking another five percent of the total.4 Among the major nations, West Germany and Japan devote the highest proportion of GNP to nondefense R&D spending ( Table 5 ).
The United States is alone among major nations in its extensive
As a writer for Fortune magazine recently put it, U.S. research and development is getting too much bang for the buck. support of basic research and its almost negligible direct support of commercial R&D projects. These funding patterns help to explain why the United States has been able to maintain its lead in most areas of military technology and basic science but has lost ground to other nations, particularly Japan, in translating U.S. scientific advances into commercial gains.
As with production trends, the activities of multinational corporations blur the distinction between U.S. and foreign R&D.
A significant share of "foreign" R&D is actually performed by subsidiaries abroad of U.S. firms. One striking example is the breakthough in superconductivity research that earned the Nobel prize for two IBM scientists working in the firm's Swiss laboratories. A similar phenomenon exists for European and Japanese firms operating in the United States. As foreign companies establish U.S. subsidiaries, these firms are also increasing their local R&D activities.5
The Role of Domestic R&D Recommendations intended to restore the U.S. competitive edge in high-technology production almost always include measures to spur domestic R&D. This prescription reflects two implicit In the past, multinationals typically centralized most research activities in a single domestic location, undertaking R&D at locations abroad primarily to tailor products and processes to local needs. The recent increase in research undertaken abroad stems in part from cost considerations, especially labor costs. However, tax and incentive policies of host governments have become an increasingly important factor in determining the location of corporate research activities. assumptions: first, that more R&D means more innovation and productivity growth; and second, that these assumed results of U.S. R&D activity influence mainly domestic productivity growth and thereby boost U.S. international competitiveness. Yet there is scant empirical evidence to justify this critical assumed link between a nation's aggregate R&D and productivity gains relative to competitors abroad.
In the past, lack of ability to absorb and apply new knowledge was the major factor preventing foreign firms from sharing equally in the commercial benefits from U.S. research and development. Today, however, new technical knowledge is quickly transmitted abroad and applied by foreign as well as domestic firms. In particular, subsidiaries abroad of U.S. multinationals can be expected to enjoy a level of technological advancement similar to that of the U.S. parent.
Absorptive capacity, rather than national boundaries, is the key to determining the implications of U.S. research and development for the international competitiveness of American producers. On the other hand, U.S. firms can now benefit from new knowledge resulting from foreign R&D activity. Narrowing of the technology gap between the United States and other industrial nations thus means expanded opportunities for two-way trade in knowledge as well as products. And the recent growth in offshore research activities of multinational firms further calls into question the significance of comparisons between U.S. and "foreign" R&D spending.
The United States is one among many nations currently seeking to promote domestic high-technology industries. This goal of government trade and industrial policies has become commonplace not only for most of the industrialized nations but also for many less-developed countries. In some cases, the cost as conventionally measured of maintaining the sectors in question appears to be staggering (although perhaps less than for the ubiquitously sheltered agricultural sectors of industrial nations). And notwithstanding large expenditures, many such attempts are ultimately unsuccessful in creating an economically viable domestic industry. Thus, it is important to identify the broader objectives the United States and other nations seek to foster through support of high-technology production.
Policies to raise national income
Economists' theoretical analyses of trade policy usually assume as a starting point the goal of maximizing national income (or, more precisely, its present discounted value). On this basis, there are two fundamental justifications of departures from laissez-faire, both resting on an assumed divergence of social and private benefits. The first justification, which entails gains for one country at the expense of its trading partners, is the optimum tariff argument. A country that is large relative to the world market can improve its terms of trade (the price of its exports relative to that of its imports) by restricting the volume of trade; the optimum tariff sets the level of trade restriction to balance these terms-of-trade gains against the accompanying reduction in trade volume. However, the same logic suggests that large suppliers should shun export subsidies (which would increase industry profits but lower national income). Since subsidies to production and export are endemic in high-technology industries, it is safe to conclude that maximization of national income through terms-of-trade manipulation is not the relevant consideration underlying support of these industries.
A recent variant of this reasoning views trade and industrial policies as means by which a nation can increase its share of worldwide economic profits ("rents") in oligopolistic industries.6 As in the case of terms-of-trade manipulation, one country's gain from such a strategy is likely to mean corresponding losses abroad. However, the implications for global efficiency are ambiguous, since the starting point is not (as in the standard optimal-tariff analysis) a Pareto optimum. return to this point in Section III below.
Externalities
The second theoretical justification of government intervention to increase national income requires that a productive activity generate benefits not fully captured by the 6 For a helpful review of the issues and literature, see Grossman and Richardson (1985) . producing firm. Under these conditions, the market-determined level of the activity may be too low relative to its value to society, and there is a case on narrow efficiency grounds for a subsidy to production. However, direct production subsidies are rarely employed, or even proposed. Rather, the alleged spillover becomes the basis of an argument for import restrictions or export incentives. These policies do provide an implicit subsidy to domestic production, but also an implicit tax on domestic consumption. Their use can therefore be justified on second-best grounds if the social benefit from the production subsidy outweighs the social loss from the consumption tax.
Assumed spillovers or externalities from high-technology production are frequently cited as the main rationale for policies to promote these industries (and, recently, more broadly, to promote any "complex production"). Appeals based on learning curves, forward linkages, strategic activities, and maintenance of an industrial base are all updated versions of the traditional infant-industry argument for protection and subject to the same qualifications.7
Two important qualifications must be met for protection to be justified along these lines. First, there must actually k. an externality. In particular, this means that the mere existence of learning-by-doing is not enough; it must be impossible for firms to fully capture these benefits. This could be true because of problems of technological appropriability or because
The papers in Krugman (1986) offer numerous examples. private capital markets are "imperfect' in their ability to finance large, risky, long-range projects.
In addition, the size of the expected benefit must be sufficiently great to offset, in present-value terms, the cost of the policies to produce the benefit. This condition is more likely to be met if the productive activity can be encouraged directly rather than through trade intervention, since the latter entails additional cost. The additional cost is still greater, and the case for intervention correspondingly weaker, if the facilitating policy is maintained after the infant has matured.
The externalities argument does seem at least potentially relevant to the case for government support of high-technology industries. In particular, the fruits of research and development may not be captured fully by the innovating firm, especially in industries such as electronics where the market is served by a large number of small firms. On the other hand, there is no clear evidence that, as a consequence of appropriability problems, firms do in fact engage in a suboptimal aggregate level of research and development; rivalry among firms may induce duplicative R&D efforts. Furthermore, as in any efficiency argument for government intervention, the potential for a welfare gain from an optimal policy does not ensure that the actual policies adopted with this motive will be socially beneficial. And, since the affected domestic industry almost always benefits from preferential policies regardless of whether the broader national interest is served, an activist trade or industrial policy is likely to divert substantial industry resources into lobbying. A final consideration is that policies that promote the growth of particular high-technology sectors (targeting) or of hightechnology industries as a group will, except in the very long run, drive up the costs to all users of specialized inputs, e.g., the salaries of scientists and engineers.8 1985) . The same issue is raised by the justification of U.S. defense and space R&D in terms of commercial spin-offs. desirable composition of the nation's output. The national debate about causes and consequences of "loss of international competitiveness" has at its heart the question of how the composition of employment or production ought to be determined.
Also important is that issues of distribution and of industrial composition are intimately related; an accelerated shift away from the manufacturing industries (or from mature industries to newer ones) entails important redistributive consequences by region, sex, race, education, and union status.
Why promote high-technology industries?
The high-technology manufacturing sector consists of individual industries, each with its own distinctive economic features and policy concerns. The common defining feature is the high share of research and development activities relative to sales, or of "professional, technical, and kindred" employment relative to total employment. However, efforts to promote specifically these industries raise several issues that are much more important than for other types of industrial policy.
First, these are the industries in which the United States has had its clear competitive advantage in recent decades and which together account for the lion's share of U.S. manufactured exports. Access to superior technology has allowed American producers to remain internationally competitive despite labor compensation far higher than in other nations. Thus, there is a strong belief, both in the United States and elsewhere, that high-technology production has been the main cause of the nation's economic and military strength, and that loss of U.S. competitiveness in these industries must mean a corresponding reduction in both the U.S. standard of living and the nation's military might.
Second, for many high-technology products, R&D expenditures constitute a substantial fraction of total cost. These large costs of research and development in turn create significant economies of scale. Aircraft is an extreme case of this, in which it is estimated that the total market worldwide can sustain only two, or perhaps three, profitable firms. Furthermore, once the R&D costs associated with a given product or process have been incurred, a private or government-controlled firm may find it optimal to sell at a price that is well below full average cost per unit.
If firms or nations price in this way, resulting financial losses to rivals tend to drive some from the industry and thus curtail future competition and innovation.
Third, both technological barriers to entry (proprietary technology in the form of patents, copyrights, and trade secrets, but also absorptive capacity) and pervasive scale economies tend to restrict the number of competitors worldwide at any given time. This means economic profits need not be forced to zero through competition among firms. An additional implication of limited entry is that, from a social point of view, production may be too low, i.e., the cost of additional output from the industry would be more than justified by its value to potential Although each of these considerations appears to play some role in shaping national policies toward high-technology
industries, it seems that the last one, broadly conceived, offers the best explanation for the evident willingness of many nations to promote these industries even at considerable expense in terms of foregone national income. In these industries, world ranking makes an important difference. For the United States, moving from first to second means a fundamental adverse shift in the world strategic balance. For the major economic rivals of the United States, the challenge to U.S. worldwide preeminance in high-technology production implies a challenge to U.S. political and military hegemony as well as to established commercial interests.
For minor industrial nations (e.g., Sweden, which has its own national aircraft producer) or for less-developed countries (e.g., Brazil, which has supported a domestic industry in both aircraft and computers), it is evident that the motivation must be somewhat different. Again, however, part of the explanation Both the long period until profits are realized and the greater financial risk suggest that, even where the dynamic benefits could potentially be captured entirely by the innovating firm, private capital markets may be unwilling to provide the required financing for major development projects.
Finally, because research and development expenses represent fixed costs that do not depend on the total volume of output produced and because of learning curve effects, there are typically strong economies of scale in production --the cost of each additional unit produced of a given model will be much lower than the average cost per unit (which will itself be a decreasing function of the length of the production run). The firm's profits will thus depend on its ability to spread fixed costs over a sufficiently large volume of output. Another consequence of this cost structure is the incentive to sell products below full average cost, especially in the early stages of a production run. This practice may cause special problems when a profitmotivated firm must compete with government-supported enterprises abroad. As already noted, foreign governments may see special reasons for market-share protection of their high-technology
industries. Furthermore, the cost structure of these industries presents particular problems in maintaining a competitive market.
In light of pervasive scale economies, there are strong economic incentives for import restrictions, dumping, and export or production subsidies. As U.S. firms view the situation, the key economic question is not how many suppliers are needed to meet world demand for a particular product, but, rather, how many different manufacturing entities, each competing for a favorable share of a finite market, can the world industry support?
United States reliance on the market as the major mechanism for allocating productive resources entails a belief that investors should be rewarded for risk-taking through higher-thanaverage anticipated profits. In particular, this means the possibility of losses as well as profits from any given undertaking. However, high-technology industries pose special 
III. Alternative policy regimes
A wide variety of policy measures may be used to enhance the competitive performance of high-technology industries. Because these industries are often characterized by oligopolistic rather than highly competitive markets, because of the important role of governments both as consumers and as producers, and because multiple criteria (economic, political, and strategic) are used in evaluating outcomes, economic theory can offer few firm guidelines concerning the potential costs and benefits of policies to promote high-technology production or to protect national shares in global markets for specific products.9
Rather than attempting here to catalog every possible outcome --in any case, an impossible task --it may be helpful to enumerate the most important dimensions along which the outcomes of alternative policy regimes may be measured.
Specifically, policy outcomes may be judged on the basis of their effects on market competition (number of firms worldwide and in a specific market), cost of production, product "variety" available to consumers, and national share of global economic profits for the industry.
The last of these is easiest to evaluate. The industries in question are ones in which positive economic profits (supernormal profits) may be sustained indefinitely. Therefore, other things See, however, Grossman and Richardson (1985) for an excellent account of the ambiguous economic considerations and references to the relevant technical literature. Dixit and Kyle (1985) analyze the many possible outcomes in a very simple case of two countries and two firms. equal, a country will benefit from increasing its share of the market and, thereby, its share of the (relatively fixed) pool of global profits. Although these gains will arise in the form of higher profits of the relevant national firms, they will normally be shared more broadly through factor payments and taxes.
However, one nation's gain in this dimension is necessarily another nation's loss.
Competition among nations for the fixed total can only reduce world welfare and may well reduce welfare also for each competing nation (the latter is not assured, even when all nations retaliate optimally to their competitors' profit-grabbing tactics). Because of the certainty of global losses and the likelihood of national losses from competition of this type, there is a clear case for international agreements to limit at least the most obvious forms of it.
Again holding other considerations constant, more firms serving a given market means more competition and greater economic efficiency. In this case, however, the gains come in the form of benefits to consumers from a larger volume of production and lower price. Economic profits are expected to decline as the number of competing firms increases, although the possibility of exit ensures an adequate expected return.
For industries in which the number of firms has no important relationship to cost per unit or to product variety, more competing firms will always be economically beneficial. This suggests that market-share protection has greater expected benefits (or lower social costs) when it increases national firms' share in an integrated global market than when it reserves a particular segment of the market for its own firms. By this logic, the Airbus market-competition strategy is preferable from an efficiency point of view to a restricted-market approach (along the lines of the U.S.-Japan semiconductor agreement) that achieved the same sales volumes for Airbus and Boeing.
This analysis of competing suppliers would be sufficient in an industry in which costs were unrelated to the level of output (constant returns to scale) or tended to increase with the level of output, and each firm supplied an identical product. For the high-technology industries, however, neither situation is typical. Choice among a greater range of related products is clearly an additional advantage from policies that increase the number of firms competing to serve a given market. Unfortunately, the issue of cost per unit tends to cut in the opposite direction.
With strong static and dynamic economies of scale, a larger number of firms means higher cost per unit. Ignoring for a moment the issue of variety, the social optimum would be achieved with a single producer selling its product at marginal cost.
However, this arrangement requires a subsidy to that firm in excess of the full cost of research and development. The distributional and political issues raised by this solution of the natural-monopoly problem are well known. One possible compromise is average-cost pricing, typical in public utilities.
In mature industries, a major problem associated with regulation of natural monopoly is lack of incentive for cost minimization and an associated incentive for overcapitalization. Implementation of either regulatory approach in high-technology sectors is even more problematic. Complete underwriting by government of fixed costs uncertain in both size and technological outcome dilutes the incentives to produce marketable results at minimum cost. This is true whether the actual R&D is undertaken by a profit-oriented firm or by a government agency. Furthermore, government bureaucrats are thereby placed in the position of making technological and business judgments about which projects ought to be undertaken.
The history of the U.S. government's role in innovation suggests that this arrangement virtually guarantees failure (Nelson, 1983 ).
On the other hand, complete reliance on the market is also likely to be unsatisfactory, for several reasons. As already noted, both appropriability and capital-market problems may prevent the private sector from undertaking some worthwhile projects. One workable compromise for the United States is to encourage cooperative ventures in which government support plays a role, particularly in the "generic" research where appropriability problems are likely to be greatest, but profitoriented enterprises are encouraged to prticipate actively. A related approach already used in the United States is to encourage industry R&D indirectly via support for university research activities (see Nelson, 1986) Even these mixed strategies have disadvantages, at least from a static perspective. One is the high probability of duplicative R&D effort unless the government limits its support to just one firm or group per project. But since such limits would eliminate some of the benefits from fostering privategovernment cooperation, this would presumably be the appropriate choice only where capital costs are very large. Furthermore, to the extent that the reward to successful innovators comes through control over eventual output and price, there will still be the usual incentives to supply a volume of output below the social optimum. If the quid pro quo for government participation were some form of mandatory licensing, this problem would be reduced but not eliminated.
At the international level, exactly the same economic problem of natural monopoly arises, except that is further complicated by implications for the national distribution of super-normal profits already mentioned. In terms of trade regimes, global productive efficiency is best served (ignoring the issue of variety) by concentrating production in a single firm. Efficiencies of scale make market-share protection an economically rational strategy for any individual country that has a potentially competitive supplier. But, again, competing efforts to achieve these economies of scale will actually result in the opposite: high-cost production from an excessively large number of competing suppliers worldwide. Here the case is even scale economies for national producers.
Furthermore, there are potential efficiency gains from measures that encourage international cooperative ventures among firms serving a given national market. As long as national policies toward trade allow the world to remain in effect a single integrated market, possible losses from a reduced number of competitors are likely to be more than offset by supply-side savings. This suggests that market-segmentation strategies implemented by tariffs, quotas, voluntary exports restraints, or other bilateral agreements are inferior on efficiency grounds to production or export subsidies that have the same effect on the number of surviving competitors.
IV.

U.S. prospects and options
The evidence on recent U.S. performance in high-technology industries is mixed. Some alleged U.S. problems simply reflect Likewise, for all the industrial economies, problems of sectoral adjustment will continue to generate strong pressures for import protection and other forms of assistance to industries losing ground to newcomers, Contrasting national approaches to the nurturing of high-technology production will remain a major source of sectoral trade conflict between the United States and its trading partners.
Simple policy prescriptions are unlikely to emerge from any analysis that captures the important features of high-technology production and international competition. Nonetheless, some broad guidelines for policy do emerge. The key distinguishing features of alternative policy regimes are the number of competing firms in a given market or worldwide, cost efficiency, product variety, and national distribution of economic profits.
These considerations suggest the utility of international agreements that limit counterproductive efforts to increase any one nation's share of world production in a specific industry, whether to get a larger share of economic profits or to capture greater economies of scale. They also imply that tiarket-share protection is more likely to be deleterious to world and national welfare when it segments the international market. Import barriers or explicit turf agreements are thus less desirable than production or export subsidies. This is a particularly interesting conclusion in light of current GATT rules, which allow import barriers and at least tacitly accept turf agreement but actively discourage the use of subsidies. Similarly, U.S. trade law contains explicit provision for countervailing any foreign subsidy but has been less successful in combatting the greater damage resulting from foreign barriers to imports.1°F inally, it is evident that potential world and national gains are greatest from policies that encourage international cooperation in high-technology ventures while limiting the potential harm from reduced competition among suppliers by maintenance of an integrated world market.
Can the United States maintain its lead? Should it try?
Many Americans are reluctant to accept a future in which the United States is but one among several leaders in the hightechnology industries. By redoubling its efforts, could the United States return to its one-time position of unquestioned technological preeminence? Even with vastly increased resources allocated to research and development, this kind of advantage probably can no longer be sustained --by the United States or any other country --in a world that has become highly interdependent, and in which many nations command the physical 10 "Reciprocity" trade legislation now under consideration in the United States has never, to my knowledge, been justified in terms of its potential contribution to maintaining integrated world markets. Of course, bilateral, product-by-product reciprocity would probably lead to market-share agreements rather than open markets. and human resources necessary to participate in research and production at the technological frontiers. The advantage gained by being first in any innovation, whether for a firm or for a nation, is likely to be short-lived, thanks to the greatly increased speed with which new technical knowledge now becomes available to potential competitors all over the globe.
But even if it cannot succeed, the U.S. effort to maintain technological leadership is likely to have important positive consequences, not only for the United States but for its trading partners as well. Research and development and the resulting scientific and technological advances will continue to provide the primary basis for economic growth and a rising standard of living. Vigorous competition, whether among firms or among nations, can quicken the pace of technological advance worldwide and thus enhance economic prospects both at home and abroad. Source: National Science Foundation (1986, p. 4) 
